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1 Introduction
Public policy and changing attitudes interacted
to successfully widen girls’ access to education in
Bangladesh over the last two decades, yet little
progress has been made on reducing child
labour.1 Drawing on original research in
Bangladesh, this article puts qualitative flesh on
emerging national evidence that poor boys have
been left behind by public policy efforts that have
succeeded in attracting girls to school. The
article explores why the returns from early entry
into work remain significant for boys in a context
in which education is accessible but of poor
quality, and in which public policy and public
attitudes tacitly endorse child labour as an
acceptable response to poverty. 
Child labour is treated here as a factor in the
inheritance of a position at the lower end of the
social scale, and, therefore, very likely of poverty.
Yet there is little conclusive evidence of how
poverty is transmitted through children’s early
entry into work, in Bangladesh or elsewhere.2
Insights from agencies in the field suggest
entering children into paid work may be a
strategy out of the worst forms of deprivation into
more moderate poverty,3 and that child labour
may be associated with moderate rather than
extreme poverty. And poor children may have
greater agency with respect to how they occupy
their time than other children. A narrow
definition of child labour is used here, to focus on
work resulting in definably economic returns.
This entails a focus on boys, as girls’ work has
historically been of less direct economic
significance and has declined further over time,
driven by rising school attendance, spiralling
dowry costs and concerns about sexual abuse in
domestic service. Rates of child marriage among
Bangladeshi girls are among the highest in the
world for which data are available (Amin et al.
2006), and defining marriage as a form of work
would be to recognise that there are many more
working girl children than figures conventionally
suggest. However, this article focuses on the
experience of poor boys, for whom work has
meant a more complete exclusion from
education than early marriage has entailed for
their sisters. 
Drawing on findings from original research in a
rural and an urban area, the next section
explores findings about the changing practice of
child labour.4 The final section extrapolates from
these findings to consider why public policy has
failed to address child labour. The critical point
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raised here is that while the combination of
economic opportunity with poor education has
been potent, neither state nor civil society have
challenged the wide social acceptance of the
practice of child labour. 
2 The changing terms of child labour
2.1 The low returns from education
The 1990s saw a massive drive to expand access
to the school system, through construction and
teacher recruitment programmes, as well as new
private, madrassah and NGO school provision. A
pioneering set of public policy innovations was in
the form of conditional food or cash assistance
schemes, designed to offset the losses to poor
households from children being in school instead
of work. The small cash payments generated new
interest in education among poor households,
and may have changed attitudes towards the
possibility of school. But recent evidence shows
that in fact the impact on poor households has
been modest, partly because few of the poorest
actually benefit (Al-Samarrai 2008b). A
scholarship for all (not only poor) secondary-
school-going girls who meet attendance and
performance criteria, and who also remain
unmarried, in place since the early 1990s, has
had a greater impact on girls’ access, although
the cash amounts are smaller. 
While much hope is pinned on the possibility of
poor children combining work with school, in
practice, when children start to work to support
poor households, this generally entails full
withdrawal from school (see Amin et al. 2006).
One factor is poor quality education provision
and abysmally low attainments, particularly
among the poor. Only half of the children
starting school continue to the final year; at
secondary level only one in five passes the junior
secondary examination (Al-Samarrai 2008b).
The non-poor are more likely to complete than
the poor, and girls more likely than boys, but
overall, most Bangladeshi children complete
primary school age without attaining even basic
literacy or numeracy (CAMPE 2005). 
From the perspective of many poor children,
unimaginative teaching and corporal punishment
make school unappealing, while concerns about
teacher absenteeism and competency, and short
teaching contact hours persist. Children in the
poorest households play decisive roles in
household schooling decisions (BRAC/SCUK
2005), particularly in women-headed households,
where parental authority may be less total. This
may reflect the stronger need to have an
educated male in women-headed households (see
Al-Samarrai 2008a), but boys may also have
greater agency with respect to schooling decisions
where no adult men are present. Perhaps aware
that gains from attending school are limited,
nearly 40 per cent of poor children of primary-
school-going age were not attending in 2005,
compared to one quarter of the non-poor.5 And
among the poorest, boys were increasingly more
likely than girls to be excluded: in the first five
years of the decade, the gender gap in enrolment
among the poorest increased from one to seven
percentage points (Al-Samarrai 2008a). 
2.2 Age-segmented labour markets 
Demand for child workers remains strong
because of a high degree of age (and gender)
segmentation in the labour market. Our
research found that most working children aged
between 6 and 18 were employed, rather than
self-employed or working for the household
enterprise. Of these, most boys were in the sales
and service sectors, followed by manual labour;
most employed girls were garment workers (all
in the urban area) and somewhat fewer were
domestic servants. 
The demand for children’s work persists because
many jobs continue to be seen as work that only
children can or should do. Key characteristics of
children’s labour that contribute to the
persistence of age-segmented markets include
the idea that some jobs are best done by small,
agile bodies – the ‘nimble fingers’ claim. For
example, children are preferred in metal
workshops because they can work crouched
inside the compartments and drawers of steel
safes; in car-repair workshops because they can
slip easily under a car; in ramshackle slum
premises because their lighter weight makes it
easier for them to climb up and repair fragile
structures; and in restaurants, because they can
dart easily in and around busy workspaces. 
Children are also seen to be quick at picking up
new skills, possibly reflecting higher literacy
levels among children compared to adults, skills
that are most relevant in retail and services, as
well as the garments industry. At the higher-
skilled end of the child labour market, they are
taken on in apprentice-type roles:
Tariquzzaman and Hossain The Boys Left Behind: Where Public Policy has Failed to Prevent Child Labour in Bangladesh32
One cannot work alone. I am a mechanic so I
will need an assistant. Before becoming an
expert mechanic one needs to work as an
assistant. They need to learn from a very early
age to become experts gradually. This is the
advantage. When the child grows older he will
also become an expert mechanic and keep an
assistant to assist. This is how it is goes on.
(Owner of a metal workshop) 
Children are also preferred to do dirty,
dangerous and menial tasks that adults baulk at.
This is one reason why children are still
preferred as domestic servants and in low-
intensity roles in service industries, for instance,
to be kept available to wipe or fetch and carry –
jobs that few adult men would be willing to
accept, but which restrictions on interactions
with men mean adult women must also avoid.6
Our research found that while no adults were
involved in waste recycling, 54 shops in the urban
community were running businesses based on
children’s waste-picking. Children are also
preferred because they can be made to sleep on
the premises, and therefore provide protection.
2.3 Livelihood insecurity
The debate about child labour in Bangladesh
often recognises that employment can ground
children with skills they can use in the labour
market as adults. By contrast, our research
identified a perception that apprentice-type
arrangements were less common now. It seems
unlikely there has been a net decline in the
overall quality of children’s employment – there
has been a decline in the proportion of girls who
work in the exploitative and low-skilled domestic
service sector, for instance. But the intensity of
the pressure to generate immediate returns,
particularly for insecure poor urban households,
did appear to outweigh a preference for deploying
children in work where they might learn a trade
or skill. One father noted that from the time he
had sent his seven-year-old son into waste
collecting or rag-picking work, the household had
‘rid itself of its poverty’. In the rural community,
pressures to generate instant cash income were
somewhat less intense; the types of work in which
boys were involved reflected longer-term
calculations of the benefits. Nevertheless, this did
not always mean work that was more beneficial
for children in the long term. The physically
debilitating work of rickshaw- and van-pulling, for
example, was seen as good, steady work partly
because boys so employed could attract dowries of
up to Tk30,000 (around US$500). 
2.4 Rising opportunity and children’s bargaining
power
Rapid economic diversification and growth since
the 1990s have significantly altered the terms of
children’s work. Both rural and urban areas had
experienced dramatic increases in the level and
variety of children’s employment. Urban
employers noted a sharp rise in the numbers of
retail and service outlets over the 15 years since
the Dhaka slum had been established, most of
which employ children; by contrast, children had
mainly worked as domestics or boatmen in the
past. More teenaged children were believed to be
working in garment factories than had been the
case 15 years ago, and slum children were also
concentrated in the waste sector, rickshaw-
pulling, battery workshops, poultry farms, rice
mills, and shops. Rural employers perceived
there to be more variety in children’s work than
in the past, with children, mainly boys, working
as carpenters, tailors, restaurant and grocery
workers, day labourers, transport and
mechanical workshop assistants, and in home-
based craft, brickfields and cold storage facilities.
In short, children work almost everywhere there
is economic activity. 
An implication of this increased opportunity has
been an improvement in the terms and
conditions of children’s employment. Poor
parents would once have been satisfied with
having placed their child somewhere they would
be fed, relieving the household of the cost of
doing so. They may also have learned a skill or
gained a dowry when they married (in the case of
girl domestic servants), so there was some hope
of longer-term gains. In the present day,
conditions have changed so that the type of work,
salary and other benefits are now set out clearly
before recruitment. A shopkeeper remarked, ‘we
talk to the parents before we hire the children –
we tell them how much would the salary be and
what extra benefits the child would get. Even
after all this effort, children quit their jobs if
they get a better offer.’ As a result, it seems, of
competition for child employees, contractual
arrangements are now firmer, and more likely to
involve immediate cash payments.
Increased opportunity means that children and
their parents are better-placed to select
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between jobs. New networks are established
with the co-workers, customers, other
employers and peers employed elsewhere
through which children learn about new job
opportunities. There has been a shift from what
was in many cases, bonded labour, to a situation
in which parents and children have more
bargaining power over remuneration: parents
sending their daughters into domestic service
are now reported to require the dowry payment
to be paid upfront. 
The increase in opportunity also means children
have new exit options. One 14-year-old boy in
Nilphamari had changed his job seven times in a
single year: starting off as a class III dropout, he
became an assistant tailor, where he received no
salary and was learning very little. After two
months he went to another tailoring shop, where
he was fed well but still frustrated in his
attempts to learn tailoring. He then tried
carpentry, but the lack of immediate financial
rewards and his own lack of aptitude meant it
was not a success. He then worked in a hot food
shop, where his salary was irregular but he was
fed well and received some tips. But he was
beaten and rebuked for mistakes and was
unhappy. He moved to a nursery, but he left after
the first month, when the promised salary turned
out to be less. He then tried being an assistant
mason to a relative. He was initially paid Tk20
per day, but it quickly rose to Tk50. After some
time his wages began to be irregular, and he
decided it was time to work on his own. His
seventh and final job was pulling a rickshaw van.
He has to lease the van for Tk20 per day but he
says he is much better off now, even though it is
physically very strenuous.
2.5 Elite attitudes and the lack of social sanctions 
What have not notably changed over the last two
decades are attitudes towards the acceptability
of child labour. The failure by government and
civil society to send strong signals about the
negative consequences and unacceptability of
child labour has meant that there have been no
new social costs to those who choose to employ
children. There is some relevance to present-day
Bangladesh for the arguments Myron Weiner
(1990) made for 1980s’ India: social acceptance
of children’s work, particularly the accepting
perceptions of policy elites and the middle class
are critical factors in the persistence of mass,
routinised forms of child labour.
Weiner argued that Indian policy elite and
middle-class perceptions of child labour were
self-interested in their willingness to tolerate the
practice, as employers of children, indirect
beneficiaries of children’s cheap and flexible
labour, or because of how child labour is
implicated in the maintenance of social
distinctions and divisions such as caste
hierarchies. The same arguments could not be
easily made for Bangladesh, even though
business and social class interests in the
availability of child labour persist. Instead, policy
elite and middle-class acceptance of the practice
of child labour appear to be rooted in knowledge
of and sympathy for the circumstances of poor
households (see BRAC/SCUK 2005). The
morally acceptable position within local and
national elite discourse is that in the face of
household poverty and food insecurity, it is
inappropriate to take a strong stand against
child labour: whereas poor children who do well
at school should be encouraged to continue, for
poor children who fail to thrive in school, early
entry into work is a reasonable option. Early
entry into work is also seen by some community
and policy elites as protecting school dropouts
from exposure to risky ‘antisocial’ behaviour,
which may later spiral into criminality. 
Debates around the recently passed Child
Labour policy also highlighted the unwillingness
of policy elites to challenge the practice. A senior
government official argued publicly that it was
impossible to eliminate child labour in the short
term, because many families survive on their
children’s incomes. The Child Labour policy is
correspondingly tentative on child labour, and is
presented as a guideline towards the elimination
of child labour that will contain a series of
protection measures. Strikingly, moves to
eradicate child labour in India have been
criticised by NGO staff in Bangladesh as
creating vulnerability for poor children. 
The essence of this position is that poverty
reduction, indeed eradication, is necessary for
tackling child labour. Evidence suggests, however,
that there are now many developed countries in
which child labour was eradicated before poverty
was significantly reduced, and that the reduction
in the proportion of children working was an
important element of gains in the overall level
and quality of education, and therefore of the
quality of the labour force. (Weiner (1990) cites
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Germany, some of the American states, Scotland,
Austria and Sweden, as well as Japan, Korea and
Taiwan as all having introduced compulsory mass
education at moments in their histories when
poverty levels were still really high.) In
Bangladesh, by contrast, a reasonably well-
informed understanding of the constraints on
poor households has meant accepting that they
may choose to send their children to work early,
under their severely constrained choices. 
There is, undeniably, many strong reasons to
believe that the relationship between poverty
and child labour is not one of simple
unidirectional causality. Child labour in
Bangladesh is not usually the last resort of the
very poorest, but a highly conventional and
acceptable strategy of (moderate) poor
households, in at least some of which there may
be under-employed adults. Children work
nowadays because there are opportunities for
them to do so, and in doing so they may save
their household the embarrassment of an adult
male undertaking a demeaning job, or the shame
of an adult woman having to work outside the
home. There is undeniably an attitudinal
difference at work here, in which it is possible to
find very poor households which invest heavily in
their children’s education in the hope of a better
future alongside less poor households in which
the focus is on more immediate returns from
working children (BRAC/SCUK 2005; on the
quality–quantity trade-off, see Kabeer 2000).
Households do not have to take into account
society’s disapproval or sanctions from education
officials if their children fail to enrol or drop out
early from school, as society does not disapprove
of child labour in general, and education is still
viewed as, at best, optional for the poor. 
There is a definite gender dimension to the
failures to impose strong social sanctions against
child labour. Whereas donors and the
international community have emphasised girls’
education and rights, boys’ education and rights
as workers have enjoyed less attention. Girls’
education has been promoted on maternalist
grounds of their roles as mothers and care-
givers, but there is a latent sense that education
is less worthwhile for poor boys, in a context of
high levels of unemployment among educated
youth and concerns about political militancy.
Early entry into work seems to be seen as
absorbing and channelling some of the
frustrations and tensions of poor young men in
directions society approves of.
3 Conclusions: why the boys have been left
behind
This article has drawn together evidence that
suggests that the persistence of child labour
reflects less the persistence of poverty – which
has declined – than other factors which have
affected the terms and value of children’s work.
Our qualitative research findings were
consistent with national statistics suggesting
that girls and primary school-aged children are
now less likely to be occupied with work than in
the past, while for poor boys of secondary school
age, work remains routine. 
We aimed to explore why boys had been left
behind by public policies to expand basic
education access. A striking finding was that
rising economic opportunity has given working
children more options and bargaining power,
helping to explain why households and children
themselves often opt for the definite advantages
of cash over the uncertain and unfamiliar
prospects of formal education. The persistence of
age-segmented labour markets highlights an
area in which public policy has failed to regulate
labour markets to protect children against
harmful work. Government and civil society have
also both failed to send strong signals against the
practice of child labour. The research found no
new social sanctions against the employment of
children: nobody wishes to be accused of hurting
the interests of poor children, or of punishing
poor parents for decisions to send children to
work. This is arguably the most moral position
that can be taken in a context in which the
family, rather than the state, remains the main
guarantor of welfare, particularly in old age (see
also Kabeer 2000). 
Yet public policy succeeded in the arguably
tougher challenge of transforming public
attitudes towards girls’ education: Bangladesh is
one of few poor countries and the only poor
Muslim countries in which more girls than boys
are in basic education. The gender biases against
boys have been noticed, and by 2008 new
conditional assistance schemes were being
piloted to attract poor boys to secondary school,
along the lines of those successfully pioneered for
girls. These may have been prompted in part by
rising concern among donors and government
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that the decline in enrolment among poor boys
actually worsened in the 2000s. One suggestion
has been that poor boys may have been
increasingly drawn to unregistered madrassahs,
many of which provide substantial support to
poor children in the form of accommodation and
other incentives to attend.7 Part of the
motivation behind the discernible shift in policy
attitudes towards poor boys may reflect fears
that this shift has the potential to train a cohort
of religious extremists. 
In the absence of stronger state and social
sanctions against children’s work, significant
numbers of children are likely to continue out of
school and in harmful work. The political and
moral difficulty of challenging such practices is
that to do so is to challenge the rights of poor
parents to benefit from their children’s current
labour at the cost of investments in their future
wellbeing. But, as Kabeer (2000) notes, while
the wellbeing of poor households is linked to the
wellbeing of their children, they are not
identical. If economic opportunities for poor boys
persist, it seems unlikely that the enhanced
attractions of school will succeed in outweighing
the benefits of early entry into work. Poor
households may gradually become less poor, but
in the absence of investment in the skills of their
boys, will remain firmly fixed at the bottom of
the social ladder. The public policy failure to
tackle child labour looks set to ensure that the
conditions for deeper inequality, if not
necessarily absolute forms of poverty, are
transmitted through the generations. 
Notes
1 Poverty levels have declined modestly since the
1990s; around 40 per cent of the population is
now classed as poor, and 25 per cent as
extremely poor (BBS 2006). By the end of the
1990s, the school system had expanded to
provide places for every primary-aged child,
and gender parity had been achieved (CAMPE
1999). At secondary level, enrolment rose from
3 million to 11 million between 1990 and 2000,
with enrolment rates higher for girls than boys
throughout the 2000s (Al-Samarrai 2008a).
The two rounds of the National Child Labour
Survey defined child labour differently, making
analysis of child labour trends difficult (BBS
2003). Evidence suggests, however, that child
(aged 5–14 years) labour force participation
declined by 4 per cent between 1995/6 and
2002/3, with most of the decline accounted for
by rural areas and the decline in girl child
labour (from 15 per cent to less than 9 per
cent) (Ali 2006). Education trends support the
idea of a growing gender gap: among the
poorest, girls’ enrolment was one percentage
point higher than that of boys in 2000, rising
to 7 per cent by 2005 (Al-Samarrai 2008a: 8).
The poorest boys aged 11–15 are most likely to
be out of school, and children more likely to be
out of school if they are in richer areas,
presumably because of the opportunities for
child labour (ibid.: 3).
2 Globally, evidence on whether early entry into
work leads to the inheritance of poverty is
mixed and context-specific. For the poorest,
children’s work may represent survival or a
route out of the most extreme poverty. But
while there is little agreement about the long-
term effects of children’s work, there is some
agreement that children’s work limits their
educational attainment (Harper et al. 2003;
Bird 2007). 
3 Discussions with Lamia Rashid (formerly Save
the Children UK Bangladesh) and Imran Matin
(BRAC Research and Evaluation Division). See
also Kabeer (2004) and Ali (2006). 
4 The study compared practices of child labour
in two communities: a poor community in
rural Nilphamari and a slum in Dhaka city.
The emphasis was on exploring pressures for
change in children’s employment. Households
and businesses were surveyed, and focus group
discussions and non-participant observation
methods were also used. The research took six
months, involving repeated visits and
interviews, conducted with the support of
research groups involving the children
themselves. 
5 These figures refer to the Net Enrolment
Ratio, or the proportion of children of school-
going age enrolled, and excludes under- or
over-aged children. This is considered a
stronger indicator of how the education
system is performing than the figures for total
enrolment.
6 Delap (2001) notes that children’s labour
substitutes for women’s work in Bangladesh,
with women withdrawing from the labour force
as soon as children are old enough to work.
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7 An unpublished report circulated among
government and donors in 2006 reviewed the
evidence on enrolment, and concluded that
some poor boys no longer enrolling in the
formal school system for which official data is
available may instead have been enrolling in
NGO schools (which mainly enrol girls) or
unregistered madrassahs, about which no
information is available.
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